This article attempts to chart the various cross-cutting forms of critique that might surface in an ethnographic investigation of modes of religiosity. It stresses that if ethnography is to be an actual encounter, then it is important to at once understand that critique itself is not limited to merely one form of expression; nor should there be preconceptions as to what subjects are capable of voicing critique. At the same time though, it is equally important to distinguish critique from judgment; the latter can be distinguished from critique in that judgment is a ratification of an already extant metric, category, sensitivity, or esthetic, rather than an open-ended, empirical, and potentially transformative rendezvous with difference.
items in the Western tradition, one is far older than the other. As Talal Asad reminds us, the origins of critique go back to Greek juridical practices (krino meaning, among other things, making an accusation and rendering a judgment), but also included moments of unfettered speech in the political arena (the parrhesia that meant so much to Foucault in his final years). This gives critique as a concept a historical priority over religion. The origins of critique as an explicit category of action was born in time and place where there was not a lexical equivalent for our current word religion (both of the candidate terms for the lexical origin of religion, religio and relegere, are Latin inventions, and even in the original sense the terms did not map onto what "religion" means today (Nongbri, 2014) ). Despite this historical disjuncture, critique and religion still worked hand in hand: for an extensive period in the last Middle Ages when critique meant " [t] he evaluation and interpretation of the truth of scripture" (Asad, 2013: 48-49) .
This link between critique and religion may not be merely an accident of the Middle Ages. In fact, there is reason to believe that critique may be hardwired into some forms of religion, by way of religious technologies such as the denomination. Courtney Handman (2015) has observed that the denominational form, in as much as it sets itself up as being differentiated from other vying denominational forms, is therefore not identical to society; by setting out and valuing these constitutive differences from others, denominations become a mode of collective critique through their marked collective praxis and social institutions. To the degree that we think of the denominational form as definitionally always in the plural, and typically as competing with one another, we have to acknowledge that something not unlike the medieval understanding of critique exists, with religion serving as both the subject that enunciates a critique, and as the patient to whom critique is directed. But there are also moments when a particular mode of religion becomes the object of its own reflexive critique. When Kant took up the question of what is enlightenment, setting down what he understood as the negative (one must obey as a citizen) and the positive (but one must also publicly question as a scholar) duties of Aufkl€ arung, the pastorate is the one of the first examples that he thought through. More recently, enlightenment and critique have been seen by some as again about religion, but in a different way. From this other vantage-one not dissimilar to the naı¨ve view of religion as rank unreason-critique is always and inherently secular. This sundering of critique and religion follows from a conception of secularism as a reflexive process of self-interrogation, which would make it a form that denies all transcendence; and while transcendence does not exhaust religion as a category, it at least encompasses (and thus exiles) religion if one thinks of secularism as the denial of transcendence (Gourgouris, 2008) . Others, of course, disagree. There are those who wish to deny contemporary secularism a monopoly on religion and argues that there are forms of critique that are not intent on polishing the mirror of secularity to form a more perfect secular. This allows them to further suggest that there are forms of religious critique that take the secular as something exterior to it, to be policed, remodeled, or perhaps undone by the force of critique's attention (Mahmoud, 2013: 58-93) .
So, critique was once religious, may now be integral to the social form of some modes of religiosity, and at the same time religion may be the object of self-critique, or critique from a position formally exterior to religion. This makes the relation between critique and religion, to be frank, messy business. Reflecting on this combinatory plurality, Asad (2013: 55) states that critique is therefore a "family concept for which it is not possible to provide a single theory because the practices that constitutes them differ radically." Perhaps. What this claim assumes, though, is that a theory of critique is also a definition of critique, that any account of critique would necessarily include something like a grocery list of concretized traits that must be checked off.
Given critique's promise to cut the edges off of sclerotic thinking and throw off procrustean binaries, it seems odd to think that critique must either have one set form for all time, or no form at all. There are other ways to imagine the nature of critique, ways that would allow it to have multiple instantiations, each with potentially different positions regarding religion. The idea that critique as a concrete practice or category is just an expression of a generative process or problem that is itself obscured by that very concrete expression of critique under investigation would, potentially, allow for us to speculate about a commonality that exists among its various instantiations, without enforcing an identity or essence on these various expressions of critique. We could think of all these particular varieties of "actually existing" critique as the results of a broken symmetry of some virtual form of critique that we could never see directly, not because it blinds us, but because any concretization of pure potential would be to limit that potential by expressing it in specific forms. And critique, when encountered as practice and not promise, must always come in one specific form or another. The virtual aspect of critique is invisible to us because the formal elements are always occluded. This occlusion of the formal elements occurs due to the fact that particularities take the place of open chance. We can see this in the way that any actual instance of critique must always arrive in tandem with both an object and point of enunciation: there will be variations in the source and form of the critique's logic and there will inevitably be differences in the agent articulating the critique, the target it is directed at, and the environment in which the critique unfolds. All these specificities stand in the way of the generally underdetermined yet in any expression always structurally determined. This allows for the abstract form to be actualized in myriad diverse ways, but it also keeps that abstract form of pure emergent possibility from being seen whole and at once. But we can still try work backward, to see critique as a swath of potential and not as a set of concrete instances. We could then articulate the potential as various degrees of freedom in critique, the multitude of ways in which critique can unfold if circumstance allow. And this in turn allows us to imagine the various combinatory forms that would result from critique being paired with different objects and be set against different backgrounds.
I rehearse this for two reasons. The first is because the nature of the anthropology of religion, at least in its present guise as a primarily (though perhaps not exclusively) ethnographic endeavor, necessitates thinking through the possibly of multiple and perhaps even vying or contesting critiques that could be set alongside one another as a product of the field encounter. As we have seen, religion is perfectly capable of engaging in self-critique, and there may be vying forms of religion engaged in mutual critique. But critique does not only have to be on the side of religion, as either actor or patient; anthropology's tradition of auto-critique is both well known and well established (see e.g., Clifford and Marcus, 2011; Fabion, 1983; Marcus and Fischer, 1999) . And there is also the possibility of critique being directed at, or coming from, those that we ethnographically engage with. As both Joel Robbins (2003) and Susan Harding (2001) have observed, one of the things that delayed the flourishing of a self-conscious anthropology of Christianity was that Christians had their own critique of the secular and modernist impulses that was the compass for most anthropologists, and for anthropologists in the field being confronted with religious critique was not always a pleasant experience. But such critique is not by any means the exclusive property of Christianity alone. While we may not always like to admit it, even after the crucible of the reflexive turn in the 1980s, as anthropologists we are often unable or unwilling to compartmentalize our sentiments from our science. If we are to be honest about the ethical entanglements of the field, whether for reasons of personal scruples or empirical rigor, we have to chart the critical lines of force as they play out against one another in both the physical encounter in the field, and the narrative encounter on the page. Viewing these inevitable clashes as in some way involving the same instant, subsistent mode of engagement, while still finding a way to preserve the specificity of all the various critiques as they cross cut and circle back, can be an aid as we try to find ways to neither privilege nor vitiate any of these voices.
But the second reason to emphasize a commonality informing all these different instantiations of critique is to allow us to make what I believe is an important distinction between critique and judgment. This may seem either ironic, or perhaps wrong-headed and doomed, given the terms original juridical meaning. But I think it is important to make this distinction. Doing so, however, means giving some armature to the formal and up to now empty placeholder of virtual critique. Following Michael Foucault and thinking of critique as at some level involving the same question (even if it is always articulated in different ways because of the inherent mutability already mentioned), we might see critique as involving three fields or action. Listing them (though not in any order of priority), they would be as follows. One would be a simultaneous interrogation of the laws that govern us (understood broadly as being far more expansive than the government). A second would be a desubjectification as aspects or elements of those laws are placed into question. The third would be a resubjectification, the posting of a new life, which Foucault (1984) has glossed at other moments as "a way out." This is not to necessarily endorse the particular directions that Foucault chose as his "way out," some of which may be questionable, nor is this to see this as a nihilistic project or a pure break from what comes before. The break could be ironic in the Kierkegaardian sense, an interrogation of the rules that govern behavior not with the goal of abandoning norms, but of highlighting the contingent manner in which norms are expressed in particular ways, and raising the possibility of pursuing or expressing these norms in other manners (Lear, 2011 ). An ironic practice of desubjectification and interrogation seems almost definitional of anthropological critique; it certainly is a necessary element in the Asadian sense of critique as a medieval form of the interpretation of scripture.
This point about irony is important because it allows us to see how one can hew to truths and yet still engaged in the play of critique. If critique can be framed as a form of irony, then there is no reason why modes of religiosity should be unable to take up this stance. We have already seen in Handman's case how a fragment of a larger social can place that social into question. But there is also global critique, where the relation is not of a part interrogating a "whole," but instead of the present interrogating the past. Here, I'm thinking of the anthropological staple of "revitalization movements," moments where societies attempt to make themselves anew while still being informed by prior norms and practices. Originally used to frame phenomena like the Ghost Dance and cargo cults that were understood as religious by the theorists and ethnographers working on them (see Wallace, 1956; Worsley, 1968) , here the desubjectification-interrogation-resubjectification triad is almost definitional of this form of religion. Less exotically, ethnographers of American religion have identified instances where their informants were engaged in something like a partially desubjectifying auto-critique, as they attempted to rethink attitudes and practices about topics such as race (Elisha, 2011) or modernity (Bielo, 2011) .
These are forms of self-critique, though-instances of anthropology or religion critically interrogating itself. What does it look like when critique is pointed to another? This is where the importance of the distinction between critique and judgment becomes crucial. We stated that critique has essentially has three degrees of freedom, of real or conceptual space where it can allow for movement: desubjectification, interrogation, and resubjectification. Judgment, by contrast, is the application of an already extent metric or sensibility, and does not place anything at risk. We thus can know what judgment looks like when it is oriented toward some other: it reinforces categories, sensibilities, and esthetics by an act of categorization, rather than opening up the critiquing subject, interrogating the subject's metics, or creating a novel form of subjectivity. It does not desubjectify the subject, nor does it investigate the norms and measures it employs. Judgment is sclerotic (Deleuze, 1997) . In fact, it is as sclerotic as the definitional practice of presuming a specific set of characteristics is sclerotic, because it is in the end the same practice-the measuring of Critique, on the other hand, even if it is directed at an other, also places the critiquing subject at risk. Unlike judgment, where the real relation is between the judge and the rules, critique is a relation with the other where taking a stance in regards to someone else also means opening up and taking a stance toward the self that opens up that self. This is not an obligation particular to critique; it is arguable that as a form of empiricism, anthropology always either promises or threatens transformation through the ethnographic encounter. (Rutherford, 2012) . But we should also note that this does not necessarily mean an abandonment of form or norm, or a submission to the other. It could be merely a coming to terms with the contingency of one's own position; it could also be a deessentializing a position of the other that is still unacceptable or unassimilable, but is now not a phantasmic inverted mirage of one's preexisting esthetics, ethics, or politics, and instead is an autonomous position with a history and a logic of its own. The transformation may even result in an identification of problematic aspects of some other mode of life that one can immunize oneself against. But the point is that for this to be a real transformation, and not merely an exercise in judgment, the risk must be real, and the outcome unknown prior to the moment of encounter.
And this risk means that one must be attentive, and even at open to, the critique of the other. Because so much is at play, it is unlikely that these critiques will be accepted in the same manner in which they are offered; the shifts in context and the realignment of subject and of patient means that too much is unfixed for any substantive communication to be more like telepathy instead of decoding. And again, openness does not mean automatic acceptance of the other's critique-it merely means to be open to the possibility. But given the vexed nature of the way that the secular and religion is pitted against each other, or the way in which different modes of vying religion are in figurative or literal conflict in the present moment, it seems that not taking the risk of being open to the other's critique is itself the greater risk.
